

Division of Laboratory Systems



Biosafety Practices and Reporting Occupational Exposures for Select Agents and Toxins

Tarsha L. Harris, PhD Michael J. Perry MS, MS Ed

May 31, 2023





Agenda

- Introduction
 - Today's Presenters
- Biosafety Practices and Reporting Occupational Exposures for Select Agents and Toxins
- Q&A
- Upcoming Events



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
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Presenter



Tarsha L. Harris, PhD

Microbiologist/Form 3 Coordinator, Division of Select Agents and Toxins (DSAT), Office of Readiness and Response (ORR), CDC



Presenter



Michael J. Perry, MS, MS Ed

Associate Director, Biodefense Laboratory, New York State Department of Health (NYS DOH) -Wadsworth Center

Report of a Select Agent or Toxin Release/Loss/Theft (APHIS/CDC Form 3)

Tarsha Harris, PhD Division of Select Agents and Toxins Office of Readiness and Response, CDC

> OneLab Network Presentation May 2023







Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP)

- Regulates the possession, use, and transfer of biological select agents and toxins (BSAT) with the potential to pose a severe threat to public, animal or plant health, or to animal or plant products
- Managed jointly by:



 The Division of Select Agents and Toxins (DSAT), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)



 The Division of Agricultural Select Agents and Toxins (DASAT), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)



APHIS/CDC Form 3 Purpose, Regulations, Statistics, and Reporting



APHIS/CDC Form 3 Purpose

- The APHIS/CDC Form 3, Report of a Select Agent or Toxin Release/Loss/Theft, is used by entities to report a theft, loss, or release of a select agent or toxin
- Reports to FSAP any theft, loss, or release involving a select agent and toxin which have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety, animal health or animal products, or plant health or plant products



REPORT OF A RELEASE/LOSS/THEFT OF A SELECT AGENT OR TOXIN APHIS/CDC FORM 3

FORM APPROVED OMB NO. 0920-0576 EXP DATE: 01/31/2024

Detailed instructions are available at http://www.selectagents.gov/form3.html This report must be signed and submitted to either DASAT or DSAT:

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service	Centers for Disease Control and Prevent
Division of Agricultural Select Agents and Toxins	Division of Select Agents and Toxins
4700 River Road Unit 2, Mailstop 22, Cubicle 1A07	1600 Citton Road NE, Maiistop H21-4
Riverdale, MD 20737	Atlanta, GA 30329
FAX: (301) 734-3652	FAX: (404) 471-8375
Email: <u>DASA17@usda.gov</u>	Email: <u>fcrm3@cdc.gov</u>

Submit completed form only once by either eFSAP, fax, or email

SECTION A – ENTITY INFORMATION								
1. Name of Entity:								
2. Physical Address (NOT a post office box):			3.	City:		4. Stat {Sele		5. Zip Code:
6. Name of Responsible Official or Laboratory Supervisor:		7. Name	of Pri	incipal Investigator:				
8. Telephone Number of Responsible Official:		9. Email	addre	ess of Responsible Of	ficial:			
SECTIO	N B – IN	ICIDEN	TIN	FORMATIO	N			
1. Date and Time of Incident: 2. Date of Immediate Notification to CDC or APHIS:		notification to		or APHIS: elephone eFSAP		 Location of equipment, etc 		
5. Name of Select Agent or Toxin: (Select)	6. Strain d	lesignation o		ct Agent or Toxin: Recombinant Age		. Quantity (Un	it (vial, p	ates, etc.)):
{Select}				Recombinant Age	nt			
{Select}				Recombinant Age	nt			
Type of Incident: Release' Potential Exposure (After completing Section C) Loss (After completing Section B. Go to Section D) Theft (After completing Section B. Go to Section E) Note: Please complete Appendix 1, event timeline, to provide details on the theft/ossirelease incident.		9. Severity Neglig Low Moder High	gible	e incident:		BSL2 BSL3 BSL4 ACL 2 ACL 3		d the incident ABSL2 ABSL3 ABSL4 ABSL3Ag Storage area Other
11. Is this incident associated with an APHIS/CDC Form 2 (T Yes, APHIS/CDC Form 2 transfer #: No	ransfer):	Y 🗌 🗌		dent associated with PHIS/CDC Form 4 cline			4 (Ident	fication):

Image of APHIS/CDC Form 3 (page 1/4)

APHIS/CDC Form 3 Purpose (continued)





Select Agent and Toxin Regulations

- 7 C.F.R. Part 331: Agriculture
- 9 C.F.R. Part 121: Animals and Animal Products
- <u>42 C.F.R. Part 73: Public Health</u>

All entities
 7 CFR 331.19
 9 CFR 121.19
 42 CFR 73.19

Federal Select Agent Program (selectagents.gov)






Image of microorganism from Federal Select Agent Program website

APHIS/CDC Form 3 Requirements

- 19 (a): Upon discovery of the theft or loss of a select agent or toxin, an individual or entity must immediately notify CDC or APHIS and appropriate Federal, State, or local law enforcement agencies. Thefts and losses must be reported even if the select agent or toxin is subsequently recovered or the responsible parties are identified.
- 19 (a)(2): A completed APHIS/CDC Form 3 must be submitted within seven calendar days.



Image of thumbtack on calendar day 7

APHIS/CDC Form 3 Requirements (continued)


- 19 (b): Upon discovery of the release of an agent or toxin causing occupational exposure, or release of the select agent or toxin outside of the primary barriers of the biocontainment area, an individual or entity must immediately notify CDC or APHIS.
- 19 (b)(2): A completed APHIS/CDC Form 3 must be submitted within seven calendar days.



Image of thumbtack on calendar day 7

42 CFR §73.19, 7 CFR §331.19, 9 CFR §121.19

APHIS/CDC Form 3 Reported Release Statistics



Registered Entity (RE) Non-registered entity (NRE)

The non-registered entity includes those that are not registered for possession of BSAT, but have identified BSAT in specimens for diagnosis, verification, or proficiency testing.

No


Yes

46, 43%

First Time Submissions, NREs, 2022

61, 57%

APHIS/CDC Form 3 Reported Release Statistics (continued)





APHIS/CDC Form 3 Reported Release Statistics (continued 2)



APHIS/CDC Form 3 Helpful Information – Date of Immediate Notification

- Immediate Notification Question B2
 - Immediate Notification (IN) is required for all APHIS/CDC Form 3 reports
 - Date of IN should be within 24 hours of the incident or date the laboratory was notified of a select agent or toxin identified in the specimen manipulated outside of primary containment
 - This is the date that FSAP was notified of the incident
- Strain designation of Select Agent or Toxin Question B6
 - o Provide the strain designation that was identified, if known. Alternatively, enter "Unknown"

SECTION B – INCIDENT INFORMATION					
1. Date and Time of Incident:	2. Date of Immediate Notification to CDC or APHIS:	. Type of notification to CDC or APHIS:	4. Location of Incident (bldg., room, equipment, etc.):		
5. Name of Select Agent {Select}	or Toxin:	6. Strain designation of Select Agent or Toxin: ☐ Recombinant Agent	7. Quantity (Unit (vial, plates, etc.)):		
{Select}		Recombinant Agent			
{Select}		Recombinant Agent			

APHIS/CDC Form 3 Helpful Information – Location of Incident and Biosafety Level

- Location of incident– Question B4
 - This should be the building and room name or number where the incident occurred
- What biosafety level did the incident occur – Question B10
 - Select the biosafety level for the space where the incident occurred
 - If a non-laboratory space, select "other"

	SECTION B - INCIDENT INFORMATION								
	1. Date and Time of Incident:	2. Date of Immediate Notification to CDC or APHIS:		notification to CDC	C or APHIS: elephone eFSAP	_	. Location of In quipment, etc.)		
5. Name of Select Agent or Toxin: {Select}		6. Strain o	lesignation of Sele	ect Agent or Toxin:		Quantity (Unit	(vial, plates	s, etc.)):	
					Recombinant Ager	nt			
~	{Select}				j.				
	{Select}				Recombinant Age	nt			
	 8. Type of Incident: Release/ Potential Exposure (After completing Section to Section C) Loss (After completing Section B. Go to Section D) Theft (After completing Section B. Go to Section E) Note: Please complete Appendix 1, event timeline, to provide details on the theft/loss/release incident. 			9. Severity of th Provide the second	e incident:	10. W occur	/hat Biosafety I ? BSL2 BSL3 BSL4 ACL 2 ACL 2 ACL 3 ACL 4	Level did the	a incident ABSL2 ABSL3 ABSL4 ABSL3Ag Storage area Other

INCIDENT INFORMATION



APHIS/CDC Form 3 Helpful Information – Association with an APHIS/CDC Form 4

- Associated with an APHIS/CDC Form 4 (Reporting the Identification of a Select Agent or Toxin) – Question B12
 - Provide the APHIS/CDC Form 4 number (CID-F4-######)
 - If your laboratory did not identify the select agent or toxin, the laboratory that identified the select agent or toxin can provide the number

 8. Type of Incident: Release/ Potential Exposure (After completing Section B. Go to Section C) Loss (After completing Section B. Go to Section D) Theft (After completing Section B. Go to Section E) Note: Please complete Appendix 1, event timeline, to provide details on the theft/loss/release incident. 	 9. Severity of the incident: Negligible Low Moderate High 	10. What Biosafety Level did the incident occur? BSL2 ABSL2 BSL3 ABSL3 BSL4 ABSL3Ag ACL 2 ABSL3Ag ACL 3 Storage area ACL 4 Other
11. Is this incident associated with an APHIS/CDC Form 2 (Transfer): Yes, APHIS/CDC Form 2 transfer #: No	12 Is this incident associated with a I Yes, APHIS/CDC Form 4 clir I No	an APHIS/CDC Form 4 (Identification): nical ID#:



APHIS/CDC Form 3 Helpful Information – Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Worn

- What PPE was worn at the time of the incident Question C3
 - Select the PPE worn by all individuals involved with the incident
 - Respiratory protection designed to protect the wearer from airborne hazards (e.g., N95, N100, PAPR)
 - Surgical masks and non fit-tested or ill-fitting respirators may not provide protection against airborne hazards

	SECTION C- REPORT OF RE	ELEASE
 1. Type of Potential Exposure/Release (choose all that apply): Animal bite/scratch PPE failure Spill Needle stick/Sharps Inactivation failure 	 Equipment/mechanical failure Package damaged in transit (complete B-11) Decontamination failure Unintended exposure of animal or plants Work performed on an open bench Other: 	 2. Was there a release outside containment barriers? Yes No If yes, (choose all that apply) Release outside primary containment (e.g., biosafety cabinet) Release beyond secondary containment (e.g., laboratory) Release outside all containment barriers of the facility (e.g., resulting in possible agricultural/environmental/public health threat)
 3. What PPE was worn at the time of the incident (choose all that apply)? Hand Protection (e.g., gloves) Head Protectors/Covers Body Protection(e.g.,lab coat, BSL4 suit) Eye/Face Protection (e.g., goggles, face shield) 	 Foot Protection (e.g., booties, shoe covers) Respiratory Protection (e.g.,PAPR, N95): Type Other: 	 4. Did the release result in potential exposure(s)? No Yes 4a. If yes, how many individuals/animals/plants were exposed? 4b. Of the number in 4a, how many individuals were laboratory staff:

APHIS/CDC Form 3 Helpful Information – Potential Exposure

Did the release result in potential exposure(s) – Question C4

 Indicate how many individuals/animals/plants were exposed
 Indicate how many individuals were laboratory staff

	SECTION C- REPORT OF R	ELEASE
 Type of Potential Exposure/Release (choose all that apply): Animal bite/scratch PPE failure Spill Needle stick/Sharps Inactivation failure 	 Equipment/mechanical failure Package damaged in transit (complete B-11) Decontamination failure Unintended exposure of animal or plants Work performed on an open bench Other:	 2. Was there a release outside containment barriers? Yes No If yes, (choose all that apply) Release outside primary containment (e.g., biosafety cabinet) Release beyond secondary containment (e.g., laboratory) Release outside all containment barriers of the facility (e.g., resulting in possible agricultural/environmental/public health threat)
 3. What PPE was worn at the time of the incident (choose all that apply)? Hand Protection (e.g., gloves) Head Protectors/Covers Body Protection(e.g.,lab coat, BSL4 suit) Eye/Face Protection (e.g., goggles, face shield) 	 Foot Protection (e.g., booties, shoe covers) Respiratory Protection (e.g.,PAPR, N95): Type Other: 	 4. Did the release result in potential exposure(s)? No Yes 4a. If yes, how many individuals/animals/plants were exposed? 4b. Of the number in 4a, how many individuals were laboratory staff:

APHIS/CDC Form 3 Helpful Information – Medical Surveillance and/or Treatment

What medical surveillance and/or treatment was provided to individuals – Questions C6 and C6a

 Select the type of medical surveillance and treatment provided and include the number of
 individuals receiving surveillance and/or treatment

 5. Did the release result in a laboratory acquired infection or an infection/outbreak in agriculture or in the environment? Yes No Not currently known 	6. What medical surveillance and/or treatment was provided to individuals, if any? (choose all that apply) None Physical evaluation Fever/symptom watch Serology screening Antibiotics or other prophylaxis Other: 6a. Total number of individuals medical surveillance and/or treatment provided to:				
 Ta . Has an internal investigation been initiated to lessen the likelihood of recurrences of incident involving the select agents and toxins at this entity? No Yes (If yes, please provide additional details below) 					
Describe the internal investigation initiated following the incident (if any), and any root cause(s) identified.				
7b. What corrective actions have been initiated to lessen the likelil (choose all that apply) Retraining on existing policy New PPE provided Audit/remove faulty PPE					

APHIS/CDC Form 3 Helpful Information -Corrective Actions

What corrective actions have been initiated to lessen the likelihood of recurrence of an incident involving a select agent or toxin at this entity – Question C7b
 Indicate any changes in practices, policies, or procedures

 5. Did the release result in a laboratory acquired infection or an infection/outbreak in agriculture or in the environment? Yes No Not currently known 	 6. What medical surveillance and/or treatment was provided to individuals, if any? (choose all that apply) None Physical evaluation Fever/symptom watch Serology screening Antibiotics or other prophylaxis Other: 6a. Total number of individuals medical surveillance and/or treatment provided to: ihood of recurrences of incident involving the select agents and toxins at this entity?
7b. What corrective actions have been initiated to lessen the likeli (choose all that apply) Retraining on existing policy New PPE provided Audit/remove faulty PPE Audit/remove faulty PPE	

APHIS/CDC Form 3 Helpful Information -Events Timeline

Events Timeline – Appendix 1

Fully describe the events leading up to and immediately following the incident
 Include dates, times, equipment used, type of testing, others in the area, etc.

APPENDIX 1 EVENTS TIMELINE

Provide a detailed summary of events, including a timeline of what occurred.

- Who was involved?
- What happened?
- When did it happen?
- Where did it happen?
- Why and how (root cause) did it happen?



APHIS/CDC Form 3 Scenarios



APHIS/CDC Form 3 Scenario A

On Friday afternoon, your laboratory received a reference laboratory notification of a *Burkholderia pseudomallei* identification from the culture isolate your laboratory tried to identify a few days before. Two technicians performed subculturing and additional testing on the open bench at your laboratory. What should your laboratory do?

- A. Nothing, because it's Friday afternoon and it can wait until Monday
- B. Call the laboratory to verify the results, because *Burkholderia pseudomallei* is not known in your area
- C. Immediately notify FSAP, because the two technicians worked on the open bench with a select agent
- D. I do not know



APHIS/CDC Form 3 Scenario A Response

On Friday afternoon, your laboratory received a reference laboratory notification of a *Burkholderia pseudomallei* identification from the culture isolate your laboratory tried to identify a few days before. Two technicians performed subculturing and additional testing on the open bench at your laboratory. What should your laboratory do?

- A. Nothing, because it's Friday afternoon and it can wait until Monday
 B. Call the laboratory to verify the results, because *Burkholderia pseudomallei* is not known in
- your area C. Immediately notify FSAP, because the two technicians worked on the open bench with a select
 - agent
- D. I do not know



APHIS/CDC Form 3 Scenario B

While performing diagnostic testing, **Laboratorian A** opened a blood agar plate on the open bench and observed tiny colonies. The next day, **Laboratorian B** took the plate to the biosafety cabinet to perform a Gram stain and other assays. **Laboratorian C** later opened the plate on the bench to collect a colony to spot a MALDI-TOF slide. The isolate was identified as select agent. All laboratorians wore a lab coat and gloves and no others were present in the laboratory.

Which laboratorians should be counted on the Form 3 as an occupational exposure to a select agent?

- A. Laboratorian A only
- B. Laboratorians B and C
- C. Laboratorians A and C
- D. All Laboratorians



APHIS/CDC Form 3 Scenario B Response

While performing diagnostic testing, **Laboratorian A** opened a blood agar plate on the open bench and observed tiny colonies. The next day, **Laboratorian B** took the plate to the biosafety cabinet to perform a Gram stain and other assays. **Laboratorian C** later opened the plate on the bench to collect a colony to spot a MALDI-TOF slide. The isolate was sent to and identified as a select agent by the state reference laboratory. All laboratorians wore a lab coat and gloves and no others were present in the laboratory.

Which laboratorians should be counted on the Form 3 as an occupational exposure to a select agent?

- A. Laboratorian A only
- B. Laboratorians B and C
- C. Laboratorians A and C opened the plate or worked with the select agent outside of primary containment
- D. All Laboratorians



APHIS/CDC Form 3 Scenario C

Which do you think is the most frequently reported select agent by non-registered entities (NREs) for incidents involving a release and/or occupational exposure?

- A. Brucella melitensis
- B. Avian influenza virus
- C. Francisella tularensis
- D. Botulinum neurotoxin producing species of *Clostridium*
- E. SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV)



APHIS/CDC Form 3 Scenario C Response

Which do you think is the most frequently reported select agent by non-registered entities (NREs) for incidents involving a release and/or occupational exposure?

A. Brucella melitensis

Β.

- Avian influenza virus
- Francisella tularensis
- D. Botulinum neurotoxin producing species of *Clostridium*
- E. SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV)



www.selectagents.gov

CDC Contact Information Division of Select Agents and Toxins Irsat@cdc.gov 404-718-2000 APHIS Contact Information Division of Agricultural Select Agents and Toxins <u>DASAT@usda.gov</u> 301-851-2070



The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.





Safely Implementing MALDI-TOF MS Commonly Used In Clinical Laboratories

Michael Perry, MS, MSED Wadsworth Center, NYSDOH

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<u>Overview</u>

- Matrix Assisted Laser
 Desorption/Ionization Time of Flight
 Mass Spectrometry (MALDI-TOF MS)
- Facility/Safety Considerations
- Examples of High-Risk Pathogens in Clinical Labs
- Clinical Cases
- Best Practices

Objectives

- Identify biosafety practices to minimize the release or exposure to select agents or toxins while using the MALDI-TOF instrument.
- Recognize a release or exposure incident while handling a select agent or toxin.




MALDI-TOF MS Technology

Ionization Source

- Matrix Assisted Laser Desorption/Ionization Mass Spectrometry (MALDI MS)
- Ions are created in the sample as a result of pulsed laser irradiation
- Mass Analyzer
 - Time of flight (TOF)
 - Uniform electromagnetic force is applied to all ions at the same time, causing them to accelerate down a flight tube
 - Lighter ions travel faster, arrive at the detector first (m/z)





Facility and Safety – General Safety Considerations

- Direct contact with reagents
- Exposure to chemical fumes



https://www.pngegg.com/en/png-bbekj/download; https://www.vecteezy.com/free-vector/biohazard

- Examining or manipulating cultured microorganisms
- Handling prepared target slides or plates
- Safe handling of primary patient specimen cultured microorganism to prevent Laboratory Acquired Infections (LAIs)



Chemical Hazard Considerations

- Phenolic acid matrix (typically α-Cyano-4-hydroxycinnamic acid) that is solubilized with organic solvents
- Additional chemicals
 - Acetonitrile
 - Ethanol
 - Formic Acid
 - Trifluoroacetic acid
- Small aliquots of matrix and FA solutions can be handled safely on the benchtop
 - Gloves, protective clothing, well-ventilated room
- Other processes may involve larger volumes and more hazardous chemicals
 - Should be performed in a chemical fume hood



Safety Considerations: Biohazards

- Highest risk:
 - Handling/manipulation of specimens
 - Disposal of primary specimens
 - Cultured microorganisms before analysis



for-gp-and-ruo-systems.html

- Direct transfer onto a MALDI-TOF target should be performed with caution using BSL-2 practices and facilities
 - <u>However</u>, manipulation should use more stringent biosafety practices
 - At minimum, spotting should be performed within a laminar flow BSC.
 - If not, a face shield should be used
- Inactivation with Matrix
 - Biomass thickness
 - Encompassing the spot
- Every lab should adopt and verify recommended inactivation protocols



MALDI MS TOF Method – Inactivation Efficiency

AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR MICROBIOLOGY

Safety and Accuracy of Matrix-Assisted Laser Desorption Ionization–Time of Flight Mass Spectrometry for Identification of Highly Pathogenic Organisms

James T. Rudrik,^a Marty K. Soehnlen,^a Michael J. Perry,^b Maureen M. Sullivan,^c Wanda Reiter-Kintz,^d Philip A. Lee,^e Denise Pettit,^f Anthony Tran,^g Erin Swaney^h

https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29021156/

Article Conclusion:

- Direct and extended direct methods may contain viable organisms
- Tube extraction method no viable organisms
- Exposure to air decreased the viability of *C. botulinum / C. perfringens*
- Used surrogates or attenuated strains, results for wild type strains might vary

Recommendations:

- Suspected highly pathogenic organisms use tube extraction method
- Ideally, sample preparation in a BSL-3 or minimally BSC
- Filter tube extraction (0.1 µM filter)



Inadvertent Analysis of High-Risk Pathogens

- Despite enhanced biosafety education and improved lab practices, LAI continue to pose a risk to personnel
- If a high-risk infectious agent is suspected, labs should consult with appropriate reference lab before beginning any testing
- Analysis of known high-risk pathogens should be avoided



Picture courtesy of Mike Wren, NYSDOH



Inadvertent Analysis of High-Risk Pathogens

High-risk or select agent on a MALDI-TOF MS

- Immediately report incident
- Follow institutions biosafety and infection control procedures

Risk management steps should include:

- Determining who was potentially exposed
- What safety measures were taken
- Post exposure prophylaxis and/or health monitoring
- Sequester materials
- Autoclave contaminated disposables
- Thoroughly clean affected bench areas



Picture courtesy of Mike Perry, NYSDOH



Inadvertent Analysis of High-Risk Pathogens

- Additional safety measures are needed because database limitations exist
 - Closely related ID or "no identification" may indicate the presence of a high-risk pathogen
- Early indicators should be used to prevent inadvertent analysis of high-risk pathogens
 - Gram Stain
 - Biochemical Results
 - Travel History




Clinical Cases



High Risk Pathogen Exposure

- In 2015, NYS had 4 High Risk Pathogen cases in a 3-month period
- 3 cases resulted in laboratory acquired exposures
- NYC and NYS sent out alerts to clinical labs and physicians to remind them about proper lab protocols involving isolation of High Risk Pathogens and alerting the lab if physicians are suspicious



Health Commerce Communication to NYS Permitted Labs, Dec 2015



Brucella Exposure

- Several exposures related to new instrumentation in the lab (MALDI-TOF)
- Public Health Laboratory Response Network (LRN) works with labs to provide information on prevention of lab acquired exposures and infections
- Evaluate MALDI-TOF for biosafety concerns



Picture courtesy of Mike Perry, NYSDOH



Brucella Exposure at 3 Labs from 1 Patient

Isolates Received at WC (05/2016) – Patient traveled from Mexico to US in 12/2015


- Isolate 1
 - Isolate received for confirmation from hospital 1
 - Hospital 1 ID'ed isolate as *Haemophilus influenzae*, gram negative coccobacillus
 - Sub-cultured on bench, PCR ruled out Haemophilus influenzae
 - Re-plated and prepared for MALDI-TOF MS on the benchtop
 - No indication this isolate was *Brucella* until 2nd isolate (below) was identified at Wadsworth Center

Isolate 2

- Isolate from same patient from hospital 2
- ID'ed at hospital 2 as unknown Gram-negative coccobacillus
- Worked up in BSC but initial biochemical did not rule-in Brucella
- Re-plated and prepared for MALDI-TOF MS on the benchtop.
- MALDI-TOF ID'ed high match to Brucella
- Isolate was moved to the BSL-3 where confirmatory methods ID'ed Brucella melitensis



49




Why did exposures occur?

- Rule-out algorithm was too complex
 - Needs to be simplified
- Use of Bunsen burner to sterilize metal inoculating loop – generates aerosols
 - Use microincinerators
- Spotting MALDI plates on open bench without facial barrier
 - Use face shield, benchtop shield, or BSC



https://www.aphl.org/aboutAPHL/publications/Do cuments/PHPR-2020-Biothreat-Rule-Out.pdf





Recent *Brucella* **Exposure case** in NYS

04/2017

- Large network micro lab
 - Patient traveled to Mexico
 - Blood culture bottle indicated positive after 3 days
 - Oxidase, urease, catalase positive Open Bench
 - Small faint colonies on blood plate after 24 hrs, lab decided to run it on MALDI
 - Prepared slide on open bench
 - MALDI No Identification
 - Gram strain from blood plate indicated gram negative coccobacilli
 - Lab consists of a large open room with many technologists resulting in numerous laboratory exposures



Success!...Someone is listening

- Sentinel lab received positive *Brucella* specimen in 2016
- Multiple laboratory exposures in 2016
- Lab received a specimen for identification in 2017
- All work was in a BSC
 - Positive blood culture bottle
 - Gram stain gram negative coccobacilli
 - Culturing and subbing
- No additional work was conducted
- Secured subbed plates and blood culture bottle
- Two hospital labs, both received samples from the same patient



Success!...Someone is listening

*Number exposures = 0



Risk Assessment: Things to Consider

Primary Concerns for MALDI-TOF

- Extraction Method
- Initial spotting
- Matrix application
- MALDI target transfer/removal to instrument
- Target cleaning



Risk Assessment: Things to Consider

- Sample Preparation Considerations
- Decontamination Considerations



Risk Assessment: Things to Consider

Sample Preparation Considerations

- Review the culture handling steps when picking colony
- Which extraction/processing sample preparation method was used?
 - Direct transfer
 - Recommended by manufacturers, but can result in viable organism handling
 - On-plate formic acid
 - Ethanol and Formic Acid tube extraction
- Filtration step used?
- How was the application/smear step performed?
- How was the matrix added?
- Was the sample(s) loaded into the MALDI properly
- Was a standard inoculum used
 - Inoculum biomass may play a role in inactivation
- Correctly following procedural steps



Risk Assessment: Things to Consider

Decontamination Considerations

- Don appropriate PPE
- Use appropriate disinfectant
- Decontaminate outside of instrument and any space around it
- Decontaminate the inside of the tray and sample door
- Decontaminate any other involved areas
 - BSC
 - Secondary containment
 - Transfer equipment
- Change filters
- Do not attempt to disinfect or decontaminate the inside of the instrument without consulting with the manufacturer
 - Call manufacturer to explain the incident and request their input for decontamination response

Wadsworth

Center

of Health



Conclusion

What biosafety steps can help to prevent exposures?

- Blood culture bottles vented in BSC
- BSC used when working with unknowns
 - Slow growing
 - Gram negative/variable organisms
- Reviewing ASM protocols for ruling-out and referring potential BT agents
- Contacting LRN lab before starting work with potential high-risk pathogens
- Limiting the use of automated ID systems
- Implementing use of benchtop shields and/or face protection



What questions can labs ask when implementing new platforms?

- Any potential aerosol generating steps?
- Any potential spills or splashes, or other areas of contamination concern?
- Any facility specific concerns?
 - Staff performing the procedures
 - Area where work was conducted
- Appropriate PPE used?
- Appropriate/current training provided?
- Inactivation method previously verified?






Questions?



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Thank You!

